毛兴小：《World Politics》摘要翻译
【编者按】为提升试验班学员关注学科前沿的国际意识，根据学科专业不同，试验班为每个学员分配一个国际权威期刊，对最新文献进行摘要翻译。这些期刊主要集中在政治学、国际关系、公共行政、公共政策、哲学等领域。从本周开始，公众号将每周推出一期。本期是由2015级国际政治专业毛兴小同学负责的期刊《World Politics》，共有4篇文章，敬请大家分享阅读。对于翻译不精准之处，欢迎提出宝贵意见，大家一起研讨。
【期刊简介】World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, and review articles bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics.
War Outcomes and Leader Tenure
A growing body of literature argues that war outcomes affect leaders ‘tenure inoffice.But disagreement persists over how domestic political institutions translate performance in war into leader accountability. Some scholars argue that the tenure of democratic leaders is most sensitive to war outcomes, while others posit that autocratic leaders are more likelyto be punished or rewarded for the outcomes of conflicts. The authors argue that existing research fails to take into account two important factors: whether the leader is viewed as culpable for the country's entry into the conflict,and whether the country features domestic institutions that make theleader vulnerable toremoval from office, which varies greatly across nondemocracies.After taking leaders’ culpability and into account, the authors show that the tenures of culpable,democratic leaders and culpable, vulnerable,nondemocratic leaders are sensitive to war outcomes. By contrast, the tenures of nondemocraticleaders who are less vulnerable to removal are not sensitive to war outcomes,regardless of their culpability.
战争结果与领导任期
越来越多的文献认为战争的结果影响领导人的任期，但对于国内政治制度将战争结果转化为对领导人的问责机制仍然一直存在分歧。一些学者认为民主体制的国家领导人的任期对战争结果最为敏感，而另一些学者则认为独裁体制国家领导人更可能因为战争冲突被惩罚或者被奖励。作者认为当前的研究未能考虑两个重要因素：国家领导人是否会因为该地区进入战争冲突而被认为有罪，和具有国家政治制度的特征，比如民主体制下的国家领导人更容易被免职，而在非民主国家却表现出很大的不同。在考虑到领导人介入战争的罪过和领导人位置的脆弱性后，作者表明：被认为任期内有战争过错的民主体制国家领导人，和被认为有过错的，领导位置脆弱的独裁者对战争结果都是敏感的。相比之下，领导位置不太脆弱的独裁领导人任期对战争结果并不敏感，无论其是否会被认为存在战争介入的罪过。
The Middle-Income Trap: More Politics than Economics
Economists have identified theexistence of a middle-income（MI） trap but have yetto analyze the politics of this trap. The authors argue that countries in the MI trap face two major institutional and political challenges. First, the policies necessary to upgrade productivity—as in human capital and innovation——require enormous investment ininstitutional capacity.Second, these institutional challenges come at a time when political capacity for building these institutions is weak, Politics are stalledin particular by fractured social groups, especially business and labor, and more generally by inequality. These conditions result in large measure from previous trajectories of growth.The empirical analysis concentrates on nine of the larger MI countries.
中等收入陷阱：多于经济学的政治分析
经济学家已经确定存在中等收入陷阱，但还并未就中等收入陷阱的政治学特征做出解答。作者认为：进入中等收入陷阱的国家，面临来自制度的和政治的两大主要挑战。首先，类似旨在提升生产效率的人力资本和创新的投资，政府需要出台必要的政策增加旨在提升制度能力的人力资本和创新的投资。第二，当国家政治运行的制度建设能力变弱时，挑战随之即来。更为普遍的社会不平等和社会组织的破裂，尤其是企业和劳动之间的破裂，会引致政治的加速溃败。通过对九个较大的中等收入国家的实证分析，文章发现：基于以前增长轨迹的大量措施源于制度和政治两个方面的条件制约。
Political Repression and the Destruction of Dissident Organizations: Evidence from the Archives of the Guatemalan National Police
How does repression influence overt, collective challenges directed against political authority? Todate, answers to this question have been inconclusive. This article argues that recent works inadequately address the topic because the focus has been on repression's impact on local civilians, with less consideration of dissident organizations. The author develops an organizational theory of challenger development and specifies predictions for how repression's effects on dissent are contingent upon the types of organizational behaviors targeted for coercion. The analysis employs original, microlevel data collected from previously confidential Guatemalan National Police records to assess the effects of repression duringthe years 1975 to 1985. Results show that the effects of repression are more complex than previously imagined. When repression targets the clandestine activities necessary to develop and sustain dissident organizations, such as holding meetings, training participants, and campaigning forfunds, dissent declines significantly. But when repression is directed at ongoing, overt, collective challenges, itmotivates a backlash that escalates dissent. Implications are drawn for how political order and conflict are understood and studied.
政治镇压与政治异见组织的破灭：
来自危地马拉国家警察局档案的实证
政治镇压是如何显著影响那些对政治权威构成直接挑战的集体行动？到目前为止，这个问题的答案是不确定的。本文认为近期的文献不足以解决这一问题，因为既有研究侧重于考察政治镇压对当地平民的影响，而较少考虑对政治异见组织的影响。作者开发出有关挑战者发展的组织理论，检验政治镇压对持不同政见者的影响，取决于针对组织的胁迫行为类型。本文的分析基于收集到的1975年至1985年危地马拉国家警察局原始、微观的机密档案，研究结果表明：政治镇压的影响机制远比既有的想象更为复杂。当镇压局限于对异见组织那些必需的秘密活动时，比如举办会议、培训成员和争取经费支持等此类旨在发展和维持组织的活动，异见组织的抵抗会明显下降。而当镇压直接指向那些正在进行的,公开形成挑战的集体行动时,政治镇压将诱发异见组织的反弹升级。这些观点有益于增进对政治秩序和政治冲突研究和理解。
Do International Rulings have Spillover Effects?: The View from Financial Markets
How influential are international courts? Can their rulings reach beyond a given case and affect the behavior of countries not party to the dispute? International law isclear on the matter: rulings have no formal authority beyond the case at hand. This tenetis consistent with the incentives of sovereign states wary of delegatingtoo much authority to courts. By contrast, the authors claim that even in the absence of formal authority, the rulings of international courts can affect behavior by mobilizing pro-compliance groups in countries not party to a dispute.They test these beliefs in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO) through anovel approach. Because WTO rulings have implications for the fortunes of publicly traded firms, they examine whether financial markets bet on there being spillover effects beyond the case at hand. They rely on two quantitative case studies to test for a cross-border and a cross-industry spillover effect: can rulings have effects in countries and on industries other than those at issue in the initial dispute?The results suggest that the answer is a tentative yes. The spillover effects of international rulings may be amatter of scholarly contention, but their existence is something thatfinancial markets appear willing to bet on.
国际裁定是否具有有溢出效应：来自金融市场的视角和实证
国际法庭具有怎样的影响，他们的裁定是否能够超越给定的个案并影响到国家行为，而不仅限于存在争端的那部分国家？国际法对此有明确规定：国际裁决仅对特定的当期个案具有正式权威，这和主权国家慎防委托给法院太多权力的动机是一致的。这个宗旨与主权国家的动机是一致的。相比之下，作者声称，即使没有正式的权威，国际法院的裁决可以通过动员不受争议的国家的“赞同-顺从”集团来影响行为。本文在世界贸易组织的背景下，通过一种新颖的方法验证这些信念。因为世贸组织的裁决对上市公司的命运可以产生影响,他们检验了金融市场的投注行为是否会受到非当前个案影响的溢出效应。该研究主要依靠两个定量研究，分别考察国际裁定所产生的跨国、跨行业溢出效应。那么，国际裁决是否可以影响最初纠纷当事国家、行业以外的国家和行业?研究表明：这一问题的答案是肯定的，该结论通过检验。国际裁决的溢出效应可能仍存在学术争论,但其引发金融市场上投注行为的溢出效应却是不争的事实。
